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SCIENCE, POLICY AND THE
DEVELOPING FRONTIERS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAWt
by L. F. E. Goldie*
I: IntroductionS CIENCE HAS ALWAYS BEEN a most important, if not the most
important, agent of legal change. The hydraulic engineering
achievements of ancient Egypt and China not only determined
the laws of land ownership, use and planning, but also the admin-
istrative and constitutional structure of society. Where would the
law of the sea be without the development of ships and the sci-
ence of navigation? In a lighter view too we can imagine char-
iots creating traffic problems (and laws) on the Appian Way, or
in the main streets of Athens and Pompeii-for it created prob-
lems for pedestrians both in peace and war.
But more than ever today the artifacts of the applied natural
sciences, and the concepts of social science, have a heavy and
continuing impact on much that we do and think. A range of
the points in one's daily life where the sciences have a significant
impact would include almost everything we do that has legal sig-
nificance. One example we see in our daily lives is provided by
the modern day highway systems. These span this Nation, and
make possible that safe, comfortable and speedy movement of
traffic in and out of its cities, between the areas of business, and
around population centers which we are coming more and more
to take for granted. To speed the driver so effectively and safely
over the distances he travels on this country's freeways, turn-
pikes, and urban by-passes there is a daily and hourly reliance
upon a wealth of sophisticated knowledge of highway engineer-
ing, urban development, traffic control and human behavior.
Aside from the impact of multifarious modifications recent
developments in science and engineering upon municipal law as
agents of legal change, a comprehensive discussion of the whole
t Based on an Address to the Sixth Annual International Symposium on
Space Law, Williamsburg, Va.
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impact of technological developments on international law would
require a full course, not this paper, for its adequate discussion.
For example, in little over half a century the application of
science to warfare has rendered many of the most important of
the Hague Rules of Warfare obsolete. Similarly an extended dis-
cussion would, presumably, include a review of the influence of
the aviation sciences and air navigation upon the international
air agreements and practices which regulate our present-day
globe-encircling civil aviation, an analysis of the impact of marine
biology and ecology, meteorology, ocean physics, radar, sonar,
and a host of other special sciences on ocean fisheries (with the
result that many species in the once-inexhaustible oceans are
now threatened with extinction) and the consequential obsolete-
ness of the present-day international law of fisheries, and, to take
as a final and most important example, the necessity of present-
day scientific uses and discoveries in almost every field of en-
deavor for the every-day working of the United Nations and its
specialized agencies. Brief and impressionistic as these examples
may be, they graphically illustrate this elementary preliminary
point that the sciences are all-pervasive in international law (as
in many other legal disciplines) and have a direct condition, if
not determinative, effect both upon existing rules and upon the
progressive development of new rules.
H: The Deceptions of Legal Fictions-Some Examples
Instead of seeking to cover my subject by resort to general-
ities that would rapidly become trivialities, or, alternatively, ex-
pansively try to cover the subject in exhaustive detail, I shall
discuss the problem of relating social (including technological)
change with legal change. I shall also indicate, for purposes of
example only, four modern groups of human activity, only re-
cently made possible by the application of science to ambition,
and point up their capability of either rendering legal change in-
evitable or inducing chaos. I shall also suggest certain short-
comings of one time-honored and favorite lawyers' method of
dealing with new phenomena and of bringing them within the
scope of legal regulation, namely the method of "cutting the
problem down to size" by seeking the nearest existing and law-
tamed analogy to it and then applying the rules governing that
analogy to the problem. I shall, further, suggest that such a
method verges upon one of the most dangerous professional pas-
times known to lawyers-the manufacture of legal fictions ("legal
2
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fictioneering"). The four topics I have selected and intend to
discuss are: (1) Weather Modification; (2) Space Activities and
Nuclear Liability; (3) Man's Invasion of "Inner Space" (i.e., the
the volume and bed of the deep oceans); and (4) Nuclear
Weapons.
(1) International Weather Modification
The technique relevant to this discussion is colloquially
known as "cloud-seeding." A man in an aeroplane "seeds" a
small cloud with iodized salts of one kind or another. The pur-
pose is to cause the cloud to "grow" and to precipitate moisture
in at least approximately the area for which rain is desired.
Legal problems arise when, for example, a cloud seeded by
country A causes through errors in judgment, excessive rains in
country B, causing floods, or when it draws off rains expected in
country C, causing drought and famine. Can country B assert
that A's cloud escaped and injured it? Or can country C claim
compensation for A's "larcenous" taking of its cloud and rain?
International lawyers' methods of discussing these problems
have generally been patterned on those of municipal law lawyers
and have, in general, been so imaginative as to verge on the fab-
ulous. Just like the common lawyers pioneering oil and gas law
during the last century and establishing criteria for determining
property rights in the oil and gas in a field under a considerable
number of parcels of real estate (i.e., farms, houses, suburban
lots, etc.), one group has sought to liken the clouds to "wild ani-
mals." I These are seen as only becoming the subject of property
rights and duties when "tamed." That is, as in the early days of
oil and gas law, the so-called "Law of Capture" tells us how to
apply rules to cloud-seeding in a complex civilization in just the
sort of terms that, in the early days of the West, rules developed
to govern the human uses of broncos and buffalo. The Law of
Capture, and the proprietorship rights seen to be flowing there-
from, is surely used fictitiously in both contexts of oil and gas and
"cloud seeding." Is there any need for those who formulated and
applied the Law of Capture in terms of both oil and gas and
clouds to be conscious that they were developing legal fictions in
this regard for them to be such?
1 The acquisition of property rights thru capture of wild animals is afamiliar concept to every beginning law student. See, Pierson v. Post, 3Caines 175, 2 Am. Dec. 264 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1805).
Winter 1971
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(2) Space Activities
As with early discussions of air law, a number of the early
writers on the application of legal rules to govern space activities
were governed by territorial concepts and analogies. 2 Of these
the commonest were analogies with the territorial sea and the
relevance, or otherwise, of the doctrine of occupatio terrae nullius
(occupation) to the acquisition of jurisdiction over lunar, plan-
etary, and stellar bodies. These writers proceeded blithely with
the earth-bound analogies-parochially assuming their general
relevance.
The absurdity of the territorial sea analogy is easily illustrat-
ed by pointing out that because the earth rotates upon its axis,
revolves around the sun and, with the solar system, moves
through space, the zone of a state's superjacent analogy to the
territorial sea would be always changing, and changing at an
enormous rate of speed. Even if an attempt were made to limit
such a superjacent zone to an area so close to the earth that those
conditions of change would not be felt to prevail, one insurmount-
able difficulty remains. In order to assure each subjacent state
a constant zone beyond the portion of the belt of terrestrial air
above its surface territory, a terrestrially-oriented navigation
would still have to be used for the determination of a space ve-
hicle's position. Would this be feasible? Nobody knows. Yet the
burden of establishing that feasibility is upon those who uphold
the practicability of establishing extra-terrestrial zones under the
jurisdiction of the subjacent states on the analogy of the territo-
rial sea.
Similarly, to assert the relevance of the doctrine of occupa-
tion to states' rights in extra-terrestrial bodies assumes many
facts regarding the physical and social capability of exercising
authority and control over land domains and their inhabitants
which simply may not exist when the only inhabitants capable of
being the human subjects of human laws (in contradistinction to
being the non-human objects of such laws) are members of state
expeditions, formed either as a result of the joint efforts of sev-
eral states, or by one state. Could a Russian law be validly made
to apply to a Franco-German expedition on the moon any more
feasibly than, say, an Australian law be enforced against a Rus-
sian encampment in the Antarctic Continent?
2 See the excellent analysis of the Roman view on the ownership of the air
space and above by Dr. John Cobb Cooper, Roman Law and the Maxim
Cujus Ejus Solum in International Air Law, Institute of International Air
Law, McGill University, Publication No. 1, 1952.
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Surely for a considerable time to come the basis of authority
in human affairs beyond the outer envelope of terrestrial air will
be the cohesion and discipline of each crew or each expedition-
and the jurisdiction which may feasibly be made to apply will be
personal, and not territorial?
(3) The Volume and Bed of the Oceans
Traditionally international law distinguished between two
categories of seas: those under the sovereignty of the coastal state
by reason of a number of labels-territorial waters, internal wa-
ters, historic waters; and those beyond the sovereignty of any
state-the "free high seas" being viewed as res extra commer-
cium whether as res nullius or as res omnium communis. In re-
cent years some novel doctrines have been developed for the
affirmance of coastal states' claims to extend their exclusive
authority further and further out from their coasts and into the
maritime areas which formerly were characterized as "free high
seas." Although these many doctrines pay lip service to the free-
dom of the seas, like the older formulations of territorial and
internal waters, they fall within the general category of exclusive
rather than shared claims to use a resource or to exercise a juris-
diction. These variations on the older theme of exclusivity in-
clude: contiguous zones, zones of specialized jurisdiction, the con-
tinental shelf doctrine, and conservation zones. All these resem-
ble the older concept of territorial and internal waters in that the
rights they justify arise from the unilateral action of the coastal
state and remain exclusively subject to that state's authority.
Although guided by the ideal of "progressive development" as
well as faithful to the task of codification, the Geneva Conven-
tions on the Law of the Sea, and their attendant Resolutions and
Protocol, did little more than cast the traditional pattern of the
international law of the sea into an authoritative form, consecrate
several emerging doctrines (for example that of the continental
shelf) as existing law, and introduce some reforms. The Confer-
ence did not, however, effectively temper the basic pattern of the
regime of the world's oceans.
The general customary regime has been modified, with re-
spect to a number of resources, and especially various species of
fashionable edible fish, by treaty regimes (some bilateral, others
multilateral) establishing regional fishery authorities which con-
duct research and exercise independent regulatory powers over
Winter 1971
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access to the fishery in terms of conservation and exploitation
claims.
But even when due account is made of these treaty regimes,
the traditional, conceptualistic, approach still holds sway over the
general study and application of the discipline called the interna-
tional law of the sea. This is true, not only of those areas where
regimes have failed to replace the traditional order, but even in
the negotiations for and interpretation of the treaty regimes.
Invocation of the traditional concepts only too often provides the
rhetoric for asserting claims and pressing advantages within the
treaty context.
As world population increases, so mankind is looking more
and more to the sea to supply natural resources of all kinds as
these diminish on land in the face of an ever-increasing demand.
The oceans offer us a great variety and multitude of mineral and
organic resources; some have only come within the scope of our
understanding and use in recent years, and in some cases merely
months; others have long been available. The traditional and
still-existing rules which govern the international law of the sea
have become completely inadequate to give a secure basis for
winning these resources. The economics of these activities call
for a stupendous allocation of capital, skill and imagination. But
the law as it stands at present places the fruits of enterprise in
jeopardy. It provides no adequate security of title once a coastal
state's zones of jurisdiction have been left behind, thereby ren-
dering investment in activities in the deep oceans unnecessarily
risky and unattractive to lenders or entrepreneurs. Hence there
is a pressing need to develop legal concepts and doctrines to se-
cure transactions, equitably allocate the benefits derived from
placing the oceans' resources at the disposal of mankind, and en-
sure that inconsistent uses of the high seas do not lead to con-
flicts not amenable to juridical formulation and resolution.
Edible fish constitute perhaps the oldest, and certainly the
most valuable, of these resources. But, from the most far-off
times to the present, mankind has had only one approach, the
most primitive, to the winning of this resource, that of the
"hunter and collector"-again the "Laws of Capture" provides
the primitive justification. This is equally true of the Australian
aboriginal wading in a mangrove creek at low tide and a modern
radar-equipped, ocean-scouring trawler. Today we stand on the
brink of great changes. Mankind must, to survive, change his
6
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habit from the hunter of fish to the herdsman and shepherd of
some species and the farmer of others, thereby changing funda-
mentally his ecological, social, economic and legal relations to the
sea. The effect on international law of such a revolution calls, as
a preliminary step, for the complete overthrow of the Grotian
notion that the fish resources of the sea are inexhaustible and
that all may freely fish without causing detriment to others. To
move away from the traditional dichotomy, and the traditional
analogies, and to develop the legal concepts suitable for this very
different use, and for the transformation from the existing situ-
ation to a regime which, at one and the same time, maximizes the
utilities of ocean exploration and exploitation, establishes func.
tional standards for the equitable allocation of the benefits de-
rived from those activities, is a momentous and pressing chal-
lenge to international lawyers. A fundamental task is, accord-
ingly, to point up the need for legal change, outline the legal
concepts which social and economic developments will demand
of the lawyer, and foreshadow the terms of the transition from
the existing doctrines and institutions under which the high seas
and their contents constitute a common property natural re-
source with access open to all, to a regime which facilitates the
maximization both of the resources' availability for consumption,
and of the economic return they provide to producers.3
(4) Nuclear Weapons
The morality of the Allied bombardment of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki with the atomic "Thin Man" and "Fat Man" bombs was
originally justified, and has been traditionally defended since, on
the ground that these atomic bombs merely provided a more effi-
cient and economic bombing raid effect-"a bigger bang for a
buck." The analogy here was with high explosive and incendiary
bombs-a familiar and accepted terror of civilian populations in
World War II.
Here again the use of the familiar, as an analogy, is mislead-
ing. To equivalate atomic and hydrogen bombs to fire plus high
explosive bombs is simply false. Radioactive fallout and radia-
tion sickness, as well as the bombs' known genetic effects, makes
even analogies with traditional poisonous gases a misleading, if
comforting use of analogies in order to clothe the horrors of the
future with the ill-fitting dress of the familiar present.
3 See, Pardo, Who Will Control the Sea Bed, 47 Foreign Affairs 123-137(1968).
Winter 1971
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Nuclear weapons are neither war explosives nor war gases.
They are sui generis, as are the continental shelf, mining claims
in the deep oceans, the uses of outer space, weather modification,
and the multitude of new human activities and powers which
modern science has made possible.
H: Some Concluding Thoughts
To fashion extensions of familiar concepts of the traditional
rules, principles, and institutions of the law to control the chal-
lenges of increasingly unfamiliar sectors of the environment by
resort to "as if" propositions, is to engage in legal fictions. (On
the other hand the process of change of the purposes, scope, and
rationale of a legal institution or rule, for example the British
Monarchy, the American Presidency, the Rule Against Perpetu-
ties, Real Property Easements, does not necessarily exemplify the
inevitability of legal fictions.) Thus, perhaps I should emphasize
that the concept of legal fictions used here is completely distin-
guishable from that bearing the authority of Professor Lon Fuller
of Harvard. In Professor Fuller's theory an essential ingredient
is the conscious knowledge on the part of those who operate the
fiction that the concept is a fiction or is being used fictitiously,
i.e., that the operative facts are not congruent with empirical
reality. Such a rationalistic approach is rather surprising, since
it gives little recognition to the authority and significance of sub-
conscious drives, irrational evaluations and imperfect informa-
tion. (See Fuller, Legal Fictions (pts 1-3) 25 ILL. L. REV. 363,
513, 865 (1930-1931).) Nor is Professor Fuller's general con-
donation, and even approbation, of resort to legal fictioneering
supported here. Rather than having resort to the misleading and
frequently absurd legal analogies briefly indicated in the preced-
ing paragraphs, the legal profession should not deem it beyond
the wit of man to devise fitting, if new, and sui generis, legal con-
cepts appropriate for the new and sui generis situations they are
called upon to regulate and reduce the manageable proportions.
What is needed today is not the continued stretching of
analogies, so that at least the appearance, but not the fact, is
given of still using time-tested concepts of continued vitality.
Rather there is a call for the formulation of new bodies of rules,
and new ideas to underpin those rules. My own proposals for
a treaty regime governing claims over mineral resources beyond
continental shelf regions provide one type of example. Examples
of the type of thinking and formulation already embodied in
8
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existing treaties may be found in such instruments as the Treaty
on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S.
6347), the Antarctica Treaty (12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. 4780), the
European Convention on Human Rights (213 U.N.T.S. 221), and
the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (__ U.S.T.C.
___, T.I.A.S. 6839). In brief then, Man should establish his con-
trol of the changing material of his destiny by the direct and
express formulation of the international equivalent of legislation,
by treaty, and reject the arcane and deceptive construct of
fictions.
9
Goldie: Science of International Law
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1972
